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INCLUDING LIMITED PARTNERS IN THE DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The Judiciary Act of 1789' conferred on the lower federal courts
"original cognizance"2 of civil suits between "a citizen of the State where
the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State."3 Diversity jurisdic-
tion had been a controversial issue at the time of the ratification debates.'
Beginning with the earliest decisions involving diversity jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has construed the statutory grant narrowly. For exam-
ple, in 1806 the Supreme Court in Strawbridge v. Curtiss5 interpreted the
Judiciary Act to require complete diversity-the citizenship of each
plaintiff must differ from that of each defendant. 6 Subsequently, in Chap-
1. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) [herein-
after cited as the Judiciary Act].
2. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (1982)).
3. Id. Only the Supreme Court was established and vested with jurisdiction by the
Constitution, subject to exceptions that Congress shall make. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. It
was left to Congress to decide what inferior federal courts, if any, should be established,
and within the limits of Article III, § 2, what jurisdiction should be conferred on them.
Id.
4. See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 18 (2d ed. 1973) (diversity jurisdiction issue
aroused "bitter controversy" during the ratification debates) [hereinafter cited as Hart &
Wechsler]. In the late eighteenth century, the state constitutional conventions and the
press launched their most vigorous assault on the sections of the Constitution dealing
with the federal judiciary, including the subject of diversity jurisdiction. Note, The His-
toric Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 487-88 (1928) (student note of
Judge Henry Friendly). The Anti-Federalists feared that granting jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts would necessarily subtract from the authority of the state courts. Id. at 488.
Patrick Henry assailed diversity as the "annihilat[ion]" of the state courts. Id. at 489
(citing 2 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 397 (J. Elliot rev. ed. 1828)).
Others were concerned with whether state or federal law would apply, and feared that if
federal courts would not be required to apply local law, the states would have to bow to
congressional legislation. Id. at 490. Finally, the expense of maintaining or defending a
suit in a distant federal forum most disturbed diversity's opponents. Id. at 490-91. In
spite of these protests, and a lack of any satisfactory response by the proponents of diver-
sity, the Federalist view prevailed. 1d. at 486-87.
The debate resumed in the first half of this century, and continues to the present day.
See infra note 147 and accompanying text. Recently proposed legislation to abolish or
reform diversity jurisdiction includes H.R. 3689, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec.
H5918 (1983); H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H5918 (1983); H.R.
3691, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H5918 (1983); H.R. 3692, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H5918-19 (1983); H.R. 3693, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec.
H5919 (1983).
5. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
6. See id, at 267. Although neither the Strawbridge opinion nor article III uses the
term "complete diversity," it has, as a general rule, been interpreted as requiring diversity
between each plaintiff and each defendant. See Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 312 (1919);
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1064. Because the Strawbridge Court was not inter-
preting article III, but only the Judiciary Act, it did not hold that the Constitution re-
quires complete diversity. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-
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man v. Barney7 and Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones,' the
Supreme Court further narrowed the potential for diversity jurisdiction
by holding that the citizenship of all persons composing an unincorpo-
rated association must be considered in determining whether the require-
ment of complete diversity is satisfied.9 This holding has been referred to
as the "persons composing" rule.' 0
The complete diversity rule has occasionally proved difficult to ap-
ply. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, despite ample opportunity, has
not deviated from the general requirement of complete diversity between
all persons composing an unincorporated association and the opponent. ' 2
Despite the rule's longevity and practical benefits,' 3 some lower courts
have strayed from it when confronted with the limited partnership as a
party. 4 These courts hold that only the citizenship of general partners is
relevant in determining whether complete diversity exists.' 5 They appar-
31 (1967). Indeed, Congress has made statutory exceptions to complete diversity, as in
the case of statutory interpleader, which requires diversity between only one plaintiff and
one defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). "Minimal diversity" is expressly authorized
when there are rival claimants to a single fund. This allows a stakeholder to bring all
claimants together in one action. Id.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) also permits an escape from
the demands of complete diversity. If the party is deemed an appropriate class, only the
citizenship of its named representatives will be considered, even though other members of
the class may be of such citizenship as would defeat diversity. C. Wright, The Law of
Federal Courts 484 (1983).
In the case of ancillary jurisdiction, federal courts may decide a controversy without
reference to the citizenship of the ancillary parties, although neither the Constitution nor
the statutes confers such jurisdiction. Id. at 28. Ancillary jurisdiction embraces an en-
tirety concept-a federal district court that has acquired jurisdiction over a principal
matter also possesses jurisdiction over other matters raised by the case. Id.
The above situations are narrow exceptions only, and do not defeat the general rule of
complete diversity established in Strawbridge. Id. at 142.
7. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
8. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
9. See Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456 (1900) (include
citizenship of the "several persons composing" partnership association for diversity in-
quiry); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889) (determine citizenship of "all the
members" before deciding diversity question).
10. See, e.g., Elston Inv., Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 438 (7th
Cir. 1984); Note, Who Are the Real Parties in Interest for Purposes of Determining Diver-
sity Jurisdiction for Limited Partnerships?, 61 Wash. U.L.Q. 1051, 1057 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Real Parties].
11. For example, in Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853),
the Court struggled with the question of how to apply the complete diversity requirement
to a corporation. Without gainsaying the complete diversity requirement, the Court cre-
ated a fiction whereby each shareholder of a corporation was deemed a citizen of the state
of incorporation. See id. at 327-29.
12. See United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-53 (1965);
Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207, 211-13 (1904). See also supra note 6.
13. See supra notes 7-9, 147-52.
14. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D.
Okla. 1982); Williams v. Sheraton Inns, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 22, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
15. See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir.), cert.
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ently rely on a capacity to sue or a real party in interest inquiry'" that
examines state law to determine which persons should be deemed to
compose the limited partnership.
Although these courts represent only a minority, 7 numerous legal
commentators have endorsed their approach, or at least their result.18
Most commentators criticize the "traditional" inquiry, 9 which includes
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Sixth Geostratic Energy Drilling Program 1980 v. Ancor
Exploration Co., 544 F. Supp. 297, 299-305 (N.D. Okla. 1982); Wroblewski v. Brucher,
550 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Williams v. Sheraton Inns, Inc., 514 F. Supp.
22, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
16. Although Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cerL
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), is the seminal case, it offered little justification for disregard-
ing limited partners. Colonial itself does not use the words, "real party in interest" or
"capacity to sue," but courts and commentators have assumed that Judge Friendly relied
on one or the other of these concepts. See, e.g., Grynberg v. B.B.L. Assocs., 436 F. Supp.
564, 566-67 (D. Colo. 1977); Note, Limited Partnership Treated as Aggregate for Diversity
Purposes, 9 Seton Hall L. Rev. 304, 320-22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Aggregate Treat-
ment]; 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 657, 662 (1978).
17. Compare Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir.)
(since limited partner not a proper party to proceedings, his citizenship cannot destroy
diversity), cerL denied, 358 U.S. 817 (1966), Sixth Geostratic Energy Drilling Program
1980 v. Ancor Exploration Co., 544 F. Supp. 297, 302 (N.D. Okla. 1982) (better reasoned
analysis counts only general partners for diversity), Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F. Supp.
742, 748 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (state law deems only general partners proper parties) and
Williams v. Sheraton Inns, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 22, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (following Colo-
nial, excludes limited partners) with New York State Teachers Retirement Sys. v. Kalkus,
764 F.2d 1015, 1019 (4th Cir. 1985) (citizenship of a limited partner can destroy diver-
sity), Elston Inv., Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1984)
(same), Trent Realty Assoc. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir.
1981) (same), Windward City Center v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 613 F.
Supp. 1216, 1219 (D. Hawaii 1985) (same), Conroy v. Winn, 581 F. Supp. 1280, 1281
(D.D.C. 1984) (same), Hereth v. Jones, 544 F. Supp. 111, 117 (E.D. Va. 1982) (same) and
Grynberg v. B.B.L. Assocs., 436 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D. Colo. 1977) (same).
18. See, e.g., Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction Over Unincorporated Business Entitiesv
The Real Party in Interest as a Jurisdictional Rule, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 243, 251 (1978) (real
party in interest should determine citizenship of an unincorporated association) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Business Entities]; Comment, Limited Partnerships and Federal Diversity Ju-
risdiction, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 384, 402-04 (1978) (same) [hereinafter cited as Limited
Partnerships]; Real Parties, supra note 10, at 1065 (real party in interest should determine
citizenship of limited partnerships); 16 Duq. L. Rev. 221, 232 (1977-78) (all general part-
ners with capacity to sue asserting representative status counted for diversity); 46 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 657, 671 (1978) (count only general partners for diversity).
19. See, eg., Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction and Limited Partnerships, 1977 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 661, 668 (refusal to follow state capacity law "ill-founded") [hereinafter cited as
Diversity Jurisdiction]; Note, Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings & Loan As-
sociation: Diversity Jurisdiction and the Limited Partner, 1978 Det. C.L. Rev. 177. 190
(1978) (should not treat general and limited partners alike) [hereinafter cited as Diver-
sity]; Note, Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Saving and Loan Association: Limited
Partners and Diversity Jurisdiction, 13 Tulsa L.J. 304, 311 (1977) (traditional treatment
may not be appropriate for limited partnerships) [hereinafter cited as Limited Partners
and Diversity]; Comment, The Citizenship of Limited Partners for Purposes of Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 301, 304-05 (1978) (Colonial, which refused to
apply the traditional rule, reached correct result); 27 Emory L.J. 165, 174 (1978) (count-
ing limited partners is "harsh" and "illogical").
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the citizenship of each partner, general and limited.2" Some writers ar-
gue that limited partners should be excluded because "fairness" to the
limited partnership as a form of business organization requires an excep-
tion to the "persons composing" rule in order to facilitate access to a
federal forum.2 On the other hand, the caseload crisis in the federal
courts 2 2 coupled with a pervasive belief that diversity jurisdiction has
long outlived the original reason for its existence,23 militates against any
manipulation that would increase its scope. Finally, ignoring the citizen-
ship of limited partners plainly conflicts with principles of diversity ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court for the last one hundred and eighty
years.24
This Note begins with an analysis of Supreme Court precedent and
contends that the case law requires inclusion of limited partners in a di-
versity inquiry. It then discusses the real party in interest and capacity to
sue rationales advanced to support divergence from complete diversity,
and argues that they are inapposite. Moreover, the capacity inquiry does
not necessarily lead to exclusion of limited partners. 2 Finally, this Note
examines broader policy issues and concludes that the interests of practi-
cality, fairness and judicial economy overwhelmingly favor including
limited partners.
20. See Elston Inv., Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 439 (7th Cir.
1984) (citing Chapman as relevant precedent); Carlsberg Resources Corp, v. Cambria
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing Chapman and
Great Southern as leading cases).
21. See Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 672 (basic fairness dictates that limited
partnerships and corporations be treated alike for citizenship purposes); Comment, Lim-
ited Partnerships in Diversity: The Effect of Rule 17(b) on Federal Jurisdiction, 6 Ford-
ham Urb. L.J. 271, 293 (1978) (limited partnerships' access to federal court should not be
inferior to that of any other organization) [hereinafter cited as Effect of Rule 17(b)];
Limited Partners and Diversity, supra note 19, at 315-16 (limited partnership "deprived"
unjustly of diversity jurisdiction); 27 Emory L.J. 165, 185 (1978) (limited partnerships no
less deserving of access to federal court than corporations); 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 657,
666 (1978) (persons composing result unnecessarily restricts valuable form of business
organization). Justice Fortas agreed with the commentators of his day that the distinc-
tion between corporations and unincorporated associations for diversity purposes was
artificial and resulted in unfair treatment of the unincorporated association. See United
Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1965).
22. See Sheran & Isaacman, State Cases Belong in State Courts, 12 Creighton L. Rev.
1, 46-47 (1978) (overworked federal judiciary spends too much time on diversity cases);
Rubin, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 16, 18 (diversity ac-
counts for one-third of all federal trials and one-half of all federal jury days) [hereinafter
cited as Rubin]. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
Since the Sheran and Isaacman article was published, the burden on the federal judges
has increased dramatically. In 1978, the number of civil cases filed per authorized federal
judgeship was 348; in 1984 it had risen to 508. 1984 Annual Report of the Dir., Admin.
Office, U.S. Courts, at 129 Table 16 (1984) [hereinafter cited as OCA Statistics].
23. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
24. See supra notes 6 and 9, and infra text accompanying notes 28-36.
25. See infra note 82 and text accompanying infra notes 80 and 85.
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I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REQUIRES LITERAL APPLICATION
OF THE "PERSONS COMPOSING" RULE
Although the Supreme Court has never decided which members of a
modem limited partnership are significant for diversity purposes,26 one
hundred years of precedent supplies an answer. Chapman v. Barney27
made it clear that the rule involving corporate parties would not be ex-
tended to a joint stock company, a "mere partnership." 2 While the cor-
poration was then considered, by means of a legal fiction, to have only
one citizenship,29 the Chapman Court held that the citizenship of an un-
incorporated association consists of the citizenship of each of its mem-
bers.30 Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones3 followed eleven
years later and involved an early form of limited partnership organized
under the laws of Pennsylvania. Although Pennsylvania considered the
partnership an artificial person and a citizen of the state in which it was
organized, and although the partnership shared many of the attributes of
a corporation, 32it remained within the scope of Chapman.33 The Great
Southern Court reaffirmed Chapman's recognition of two distinct rules:
a long established rule for corporations, which treated them as entities
for diversity purposes,34 and a "persons composing" rule for partnerships
and other unincorporated associations. 35
More than thirty years later, in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,36 a busi-
ness organization known as a sociedad en comandita and considered a
"juridical person" in the civil law of Puerto Rico, was deemed a citizen
domiciled in Puerto Rico within the meaning of the Organic Act of Pu-
erto Rico.37 Several lower courts immediatedly interpreted Russell as an
26. See New York State Teachers Retirement Sys. v. Kalkus, 764 F.2d 1015, 1017
(4th Cir. 1985); Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d
1254, 1259 (3d Cir. 1977); 4 ALI Resource Materials: Partnerships 129 n.229 (Continu-
ing Education Series 1983) [hereinafter cited as ALI Materials 1983]; 46 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 657, 660 (1978).
27. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
28. See id at 682.
29. See Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853).
30. See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889).
31. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
32. See id at 457.
33. See id. at 454.
34. See id. at 456.
35. See id
36. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
37. See id. at 482. Russell expressly distinguished a juridical entity like the sociedad
from the limited partnership, and cited Chapman and Great Southern with approval. See
id. at 480-81. Comparisons between the limited partnership and the sociedad invoke a
"false analogy." Id. at 481. It must also be noted that the purported basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction in Russell was not diversity of citizenship; it was jurisdiction
over non-Puerto Rican domiciliaries under the Organic Act. Id. at 478. Finding the
sociedad to be a juridical entity meant that the entity's citizenship, not that of its mem-
bers, was significant. The sociedad was a citizen of Puerto Rico, and therefore it was not
entitled to a federal forum under the Organic Act. Id. at 478-82.
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abandonment of the "persons composing" rule38 and, based on a broad
reading of that decision, began treating unincorporated associations as
single entities with a single citizenship.39 Other courts remained faithful
to the traditional analysis.' The Supreme Court finally resolved this
disagreement in United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., ' which ex-
plained that Russell had not concerned a diversity of citizenship ques-
tion.42 Rather, Russell had required the interpretation of a particular
federal statute, and the fitting of "an exotic creation of the civil law...
into a federal scheme which knew it not."43 Bouligny expressly held that
Russell did not affect the "persons composing" rule in any way," thereby
foreclosing any extension of the corporate entity concept to unincorpo-
rated associations.
After Bouligny, lower courts have assumed that unincorporated as-
sociations may not be afforded entity status for purposes of diversity ju-
risdiction,46 and that "persons composing" is still the applicable rule.
38. See Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 400 (2d Cir. 1964) (relying on
Russell, a joint stock company was deemed a "citizen"); see also American Fed'n of Mu-
sicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 686 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843 (1954) (noting
that Chapman was "losing its vitality"); Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d
355, 372 n.7 (3d Cir. 1948) (Chapman rule is becoming "outmoded").
39. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 403 (2d Cir. 1964) (joint
stock company treated as "citizen" for federal diversity purposes); Van Sant v. American
Express Co., 169 F.2d 355, 372 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1948) (same).
40. See, e.g., Swan v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 225 F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir.
1955) (Chapman and Great Southern are the established rule); Stein v. American Fed'n of
Musicians, 183 F. Supp. 99, 99-101 (M.D. Tenn. 1960) (Chapman is not losing its vital-
ity); Gaunt v. Lloyds Am., 11 F. Supp. 787, 790 (W.D. Tex. 1935) (Chapman dictates
that the fiction of corporate citizenship does not extend to limited partnerships).
41. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
42. At the time of the Russell decision, Puerto Rico was not considered a "State" for
diversity purposes, and could not avail itself of the diversity statute. See id. at 152 n. 10.
43. Id. at 151. It should also be noted that, "the effect of Russell was to contract
jurisdiction of the federal court in Puerto Rico." Id. at 152.
44. See id. at 149-51.
45. The defendant in Bouligny was the United Steelworkers Union, an unincorpo-
rated association. Accordingly, the Court applied the traditional rule and held that the
union's diversity status depended on the citizenship of each and every member. Id. at
146-47. Bouligny therefore reaffirms the distinction between corporations and unincorpo-
rated associations, and the vitality of the persons composing rule established in Chapman
and Great Southern.
46. See, e.g., Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F. Supp. 742, 749-50 (W.D. Okla. 1982)
(Bouligny foreclosed treating limited partnerships as entities for diversity purposes);
Larwin Mort. Inv. v. Riverdrive Mall, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 97, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (deci-
sion not to treat unincorporated association as entity preordained by Bouligny); Truck
Ins. Exch. v. Dow Chem. Co., 331 F. Supp. 323, 324-25 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (apparent from
Bouligny that unincorporated association is not fictional citizen). Even Judge Waterman,
the author of Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964), which had
proclaimed the decline of Chapman in favor of entity status for unincorporated associa-
tions, admitted that Bouligny "seriously undermined" his Mason decision. Baer v.
United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1974).
Although preclusion of entity status for unincorporated associations has been generally
accepted, a plausible argument could be made for limiting Bouligny to its facts. The
complex structure of the labor union would have required the Court to engage in a diffi-
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Yet, those who believed that unincorporated associations such as limited
partnerships were being unjustly denied access to federal courts remained
critical.47 These courts sought a way to mitigate the harshness of Bouli-
gny's apparent preclusion of entity status and still nominally comply
with the "persons composing" rule. One year after Bouligny, the Second
Circuit in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.48 offered a possible solu-
tion. In Colonial, the limited partnership argued that complete diversity
was lacking because some of its limited partners had the same residence
as the corporate plaintiff.49 Since New York partnership law did not rec-
ognize limited partners as "proper parties" to a suit against a partner-
ship, Judge Friendly concluded, without significant elaboration, that
their citizenship did not count in a diversity analysis;5" only the general
partners were significant.51 Thus, state law ultimately determined which
"persons" would be considered in the "persons composing" test.
Colonial and its followers do not view their refinement of the "persons
cult determination of the citizenship of that entity. Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 152-53. The
Court chose instead to leave any change in the traditional rule to the legislature. Id. The
difficulty encountered in Bouligny, however, would often not be present when the party is
a different type of unincorporated association, such as a limited partnership. Thus, ar-
guably, a variation of the citizenship rule for those simpler organizations might properly
be left to the courts to develop. Nevertheless, Justice Fortas intimated that decisions to
change the citizenship rule for any unincorporated association are more appropriately left
to Congress. He observed that even the "easy and apparent" solution developed by the
courts for citizenship of a corporation was subsequently changed by Congress. See id. at
152.
47. One alternative to the persons composing rule, the class action, has existed since
before Bouligny. See supra note 6. The class action device has successfully been applied
to the unincorporated association as a party, but cannot be used routinely because the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) would prevent some associations from qualify-
ing as a class. The purpose of Rule 23.2 was to give entity treatment to an association
where it lacked capacity to sue or be sued as a jural person, and joinder of all members
would be impractical. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.2; Note, Civil Procedure-Acquiring Diver-
sity Jurisdiction Over an Unincorporated Association, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 194, 201 (1981). It
was not meant as merely a way to circumvent diversity jurisdiction. In jurisdictions that
allow a limited partnership to sue or be sued in its common name, joinder is not a prob-
lem. Accordingly, some courts have refused to permit class actions in those states.
Suchem, Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., 52 F.R.D. 348, 355 (D.P.R. 1971).
A more questionable device that circumvented complete diversity was introduced in
Jones Knitting Corp. v. A.M. Pullen & Co., 50 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), which held
that an action against a partnership could be maintained merely by naming partners who
did not destroy diversity. See id. at 315. The other partners were "at most necessary and
not indispensable parties." Id. The device has been little used, and subsequently found to
be "unsound" in Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540 F. Supp. 657, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Cunard neither agreed nor disagreed with Pullen on whether general partners were indis-
pensable parties. It did find that even if state lav allowed a suit against a partnership by
naming fewer than all its members, such law would not bear on the federal jurisdiction
determination wherein only article III and congressional grants of jurisdiction could be
looked to. See id at 662-64.
48. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
49. Id. at 183.
50. See id. at 183-84 (citing New York Partnership Law § 115 (McKinney 1948)
(current version at New York Partnership Law § 115 (McKinney Supp. 1986))).
51. Id. at 184.
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composing" test as contrary to precedent, and even their critics generally
agree that the Supreme Court has never addressed the precise issue5 2 of
whether limited partners should be counted for diversity. Furthermore,
Chapman and Great Southern did not deal with anything resembling the
modem two-tiered limited partnership.5 3 Bouligny did address a multi-
level organization, but it has been argued that the very complexity of the
union in Bouligny presented unique problems to the Court that prevent
broad application of that decision. 4 The Bouligny Court itself conceded
its inability to formulate an appropriate citizenship test and expressly left
that task to Congress." Commentators speculate that the Bouligny
Court would have modified the "persons composing" test had it been
feasible to do so.5 6 Therefore, it is argued, Bouligny should not preclude
any refinement of the "persons composing" test where the much simpler
limited partnership form is concerned.57 With Chapman and Great
Southern distinguished, and Bouligny interpreted narrowly, apparently
nothing impeded "refinement" of the "persons composing" test.
In justifying their result, Colonial and its adherents tend to discount
the long history of the "persons composing" test as the simple uniform
rule for unincorporated associations. Had the Bouligny Court found this
traditional rule inadequate for a multi-level association, it could have
modified or abandoned the test rather than apply it. When applied to
limited partnership, the test dictates that all members, including limited
partners, are significant in the diversity formula. The sounder interpreta-
tion of Supreme Court precedent supports this result.
Nevertheless, some courts have improperly modified the "persons
composing" test, with the result that only general partners are in-
cluded.58 In an attempt to identify which persons compose the partner-
52. See supra note 26.
53. The joint stock company involved in Chapman did consist of two classes of mem-
bers in the sense that only the president had capacity to sue on behalf of the company.
See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 679 (1889). In a joint stock company, however,
all members share liability, and all are co-owners who control the managers of the com-
pany. J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership 178-80 (1968). The limited partner-
ship association in Great Southern can be distinguished from the modem limited
partnership. The former has only one class of partner; each partner subscribes to part of
the capital and none of them has personal liability for the association's debts. See id. at
147.
54. See, e.g., Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 670; Aggregate Treatment, supra
note 16, at 329; Limited Partnerships, supra note 18, at 392 & n.60.
55. United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1965).
56. See, e.g., Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 670 (enormous practical prob-
lems deterred Bouligny Court from expanding diversity); Aggregate Treatment, supra
note 16, at 329 (Court feared prospect of deciding where labor union was organized);
Limited Partnerships, supra note 18, at 392 & n.60 (same).
57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Sixth Geostratic Energy Drilling Program 1980 v. Ancor
Exploration Co., 544 F. Supp. 297, 299-305 (N.D. Okla. 1982); Erving v. Virginia Squires
Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Colonial presumably relied on a capacity to sue theory. See supra note 16 and accom-
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ship for citizenship purposes, those courts manipulate the concepts of
capacity to sue or real party in interest.
II. CAPACITY TO SUE AND REAL PARTY IN INTEREST CONCEPTS
ARE INAPPOSITE TO CITIZENSHIP
A certain overlap exists between the results of a real party in interest, a
capacity to sue and a citizenship inquiry59 because each has a role in the
threshold issues that determine whether a case will be heard. Neverthe-
less, the concepts remain distinct in theory and in function." Indeed,
examination of their respective origins reveals that neither real party in
interest nor capacity to sue was designed to affect federal subject matter
jurisdiction.61 Consequently, the failure to recognize the citizenship in-
quiry' as a separate part of the jurisdictional issue in a diversity case
misinterprets both Supreme Court precedent and the function of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. Capacity to Sue
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) provides that the capacity to sue
or be sued of a named party, other than an individual or a corporation,
shall be determined by the law of the forum state.63 It has been argued
that in determining whether complete diversity exists between a limited
partnership and its opponent, courts should include the citizenship of
only those members of the limited partnership with capacity to sue under
the applicable state law."
panying text. The dissenting judge in Carlsberg spoke in terms of capacity, but noted that
where capacity to sue and real party in interest were not the same, the real party should
determine citizenship. See Carlsberg, 554 F.2d at 1263 (Hunter, J., dissenting). There-
fore, to the extent that the later decisions rely on Colonial or on the dissent in Carlsberg,
they implicitly accept a capacity to sue or a real party in interest analogy. See. eg.,
Williams v. Sheraton Inns, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 22, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (without further
analysis, the court followed Colonial); Sands v. Geller, 321 F. Supp. 558, 561 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (limited partners may be disregarded per Colonial).
59. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. See Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(a):
Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 675, 724 (1967) (sug-
gesting abolition of real party in interest because same results are reached under capacity,
joinder and substantive law).
60. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1541, at 633-38
(1971). See infra notes 109-13, 118-20, 140-41 and accompanying text. For a comparison
of real party in interest with capacity to sue, see 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1542,
at 639.
61. See infra notes 83-84, 128-29 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 66, 78-79, 118-19 and accompanying text.
63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) states:
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capac-
ity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. The capac-
ity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under
which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be
determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held ....
Id.
64. See, eg., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir.),
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It may, of course, be necessary to determine who has capacity to sue in
a diversity case,6" but not because capacity controls citizenship.66 The
function of the capacity inquiry is to ensure that state law recognizes the
competence of the parties before the court.67 Rule 17(b) further ensures
that a party who is barred by state law from bringing a particular claim
does not circumvent that state law by bringing suit in federal court under
diversity.68 When these objectives of Rule 17(b) have been accom-
plished, the court then proceeds to determine the parties' respective citi-
zenships, using the method developed by federal common law.69
It has been noted that with general partnerships, the group that has
capacity to sue under state law is identical to the group whose citizenship
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1264 (3d Cir. 1977) (Hunter, J., dissenting); Effect of Rule 17(b),
supra note 21, at 283; 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 657, 671 (1978).
At the time of the Colonial and Carlsberg decisions, partnership law throughout the
country was basically uniform. Forty-nine states had adopted statutes modeled on the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), and so there was little likelihood that looking
to state law as part of a citizenship inquiry would lead to widely differing results. Many
of the commentators who came to Colonial's defense following Carlsberg were quick to
point this out. See Limited Partnerships, supra note 18, at 394, 412 n.166; 16 Duq. L.
Rev. 221, 225 n.30 (1977-78); 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 657, 666 (1978). Today, some form
of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) is in force in a majority of
jurisdictions. See infra note 91. Of those RULPA jurisdictions, 12 have adopted some
variation of the section that defines the powers of the limited partners. See 6 U.L.A. 246-
48 (Supp. 1985). The undesired result that the vagaries of state law may determine the
boundaries of federal jurisdiction is therefore much more possible.
65. For a general discussion of capacity to sue see 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 60, § 1559, at 726-28. If a party is timely in raising the capacity issue, the court will
determine whether the parties possess the required ability to sue or be sued. In Johnson
v. Helicopter & Airplane Servs. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 726 (D. Md. 1975), the action was
dismissed because defendant lacked capacity to sue or be sued under the law of its state of
incorporation. Id. at 737. The Court of Claims in Mather Constr. Co. v. United States,
475 F.2d 1152 (Ct. Cl. 1973) dismissed the action because California had suspended all of
the plaintiff's rights for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes. Id. at 1154-55.
66. See Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254,
1260 & n.24 (3d Cir. 1977) (diversity jurisdiction and capacity to sue are distinct
problems); Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir.
1970) ("The citizenship of each member of an unincorporated association must be al-
leged, even though the entity might be recognized at state law as having the ability to sue
[or] ... be sued."); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 60, § 1564, at 748-49 (even when
partnership or association has capacity to sue it may still fail diversity requirements);
Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 19, at 664 (capacity to sue as an entity totally distinct
from citizenship status as an entity).
67. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 60, § 1559, at 726-27. In a diversity case,
an individual suing on his own behalf must satisfy the law of the state in which he is a
citizen, whereas one suing as a representative must satisfy the capacity requirements of
the state where the federal court sits. A corporation's capacity depends on the laws of its
state of incorporation. See id. at 727.
68. See 3A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 17.16, at 17-192 (1985). See infra
note 150.
69. See Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207, 210-13 (1904); Great S. Fire
Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449,455-56 (1900); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677,
682 (1889).
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determines diversity status.7 ' From this observation the erroneous infer-
ence was drawn that state capacity laws determine citizenship 7' for di-
versity purposes. The uniformity of the two groups, however, only
occurs because the state law that allows each general partner to sue coin-
cidentally yields the same result as the jurisdictional rule requiring the
citizenship of all persons composing the unincorporated association to be
included. This coincidence does not occur with the limited partnership
because the persons composing it include more than just those with ca-
pacity to sue.72
The distinction is not unique to the limited partnership. In Bouligny,
the union had capacity to sue as a party; it was subject matter jurisdic-
tion that was lacking.73 Clearly, the Court did not hold that capacity
simultaneously determines citizenship.
The converse, that citizenship does not simultaneously confer capac-
ity, may also be true. For example, when a foreign corporation does
business in New York without a license, it lacks capacity to sue in New
York courts74 and, therefore, also lacks capacity to sue in federal courts
sitting in New York.75 In such a case, the deficiency in the corporate
party has nothing to do with the power of the court to hear the case.
That same corporation may be subject to the court's jurisdiction as a
defendant,76 and, assuming the plaintiff is diverse from the corporation,
the federal court would have subject matter jurisdiction.77
Finally, to confer jurisdictional powers on Rule 17(b) not only was
beyond the contemplation of the creators of the Federal Rules, but also
was expressly prohibited by them. 78 Rule 82 forbids construing the
70. See Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254,
1263 (3d Cir. 1977) (Hunter, J., dissenting). The result occurs in states in which a gen-
eral partnership may sue or be sued in the name of any of its members. Thus, each
partner may sue, and each partner is counted for diversity purposes.
71. See id. at 1263-64 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
72. Limited partners are members of the association, but they are ordinarily denied
capacity to sue in both ULPA and RULPA jurisdictions. See U.L.P.A. § 26 (1916) (im-
ited partners are not proper parties to a suit). The R.U.L.P.A. § 1001 (1976) expressly
mentions only one instance when a limited partner may sue: to bring a derivative suit
when the general partners have refused to do so, or when a request to them would be
futile.
73. See United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1965).
74. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1312(a) (McKinney 1963).
75. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1948) (confirming the
decision in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), which held that where a state court
has closed its doors to a particular litigant, the federal court is precluded from maintain-
ing diversity jurisdiction).
76. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1312(b) (McKinney 1963).
77. There are cases where a state door-closing statute does not promote a clear state
policy, and has the effect of discriminating against nonresidents. There, the federal inter-
est in providing a convenient forum for the action might persuade a federal district court
that the state statute does not restrict the federal court's jurisdiction. See Szantay v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 66 (4th Cir. 1965).
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 states in pertinent part: "These rules shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions
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Rules to expand or contract federal jurisdiction.79 A fortiori, it precludes
application of a Rule as a per se jurisdictional test.
Even assuming that the rationale equating capacity with citizenship is
valid, a "general partners only" rule would not always result when ap-
plied to limited partnerships."s If under state law a limited partnership
can stand before the court as a named party,81 then a capacity inquiry
would point to giving the limited partnership entity status. Lower
courts, however, assume that the Supreme Court has precluded entity
therein." Id. According to the Constitution, Congress creates or withholds the jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. By means of the Enabling
Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1982)), Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe general rules gov-
erning practice and procedure in civil suits, and directed that those rules "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Id. The members of the advisory com-
mittee that drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were aware of the scope and the
limits of their authority. Dean Clark remarked that Rule 82 was to be read as an addi-
tion to all the rules. Clark, Remarks, 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Proceed-
ings of the Institute at Washington, D.C. 60 (Oct. 6, 1938) (remarks of Dean Clark,
Reporter to and Member of the Advisory Committee for drafting the Rules).
In discussing the operation of Rule 17 with respect to an unincorporated association as
a party, Mr. Tolman emphasized that the intent of the committee was to make no change
in existing case law. Tolman, Remarks, 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Proceed-
ings of the Institute at Cleveland 66 (July 21-23, 1938) (remarks of Mr. Tolman, Secre-
tary of the Advisory Committee for drafting the Rules). The committee's intent was to
codify the result in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922),
which held that an unincorporated association was suable as an entity when it violated a
federal statute. Id. at 385-91. Prior to adoption of the Rules, the scope of Coronado had
been narrowed by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, which held that unless author-
ized by statute, an unincorporated association has no capacity to sue or be sued as an
entity. See Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1933); Brown
v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1928).
79. See Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254,
1261 (3d Cir. 1977) (Rule 82 bars use of Rule 17 to affect jurisdiction); Fed. R. Civ. P. 82;
3A J. Moore, supra note 68, % 17.25, at 17-258 (the Rules "do not touch" the theories of
jurisdiction).
Even Rule 23, which provides for the class action device, neither limits nor expandsjurisdiction. 3B J. Moore, supra note 68, 23.02[5], at 23-79. Nevertheless, it is not
possible to say that Rule 23 has absolutely no effect on the outcome of a jurisdictional
inquiry. By allowing the class action device, Rule 23 permits persons who might other-
wise destroy diversity to be represented in federal court. Only the named representatives
need meet the diversity requirements. See C. Wright, supra note 6, at 484. The use of the
class action in a diversity case, however, has been largely destroyed due to Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) and Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)
which held that every member of the class must satisfy the ten thousand dollar jurisdic-
tional amount. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335-36; Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
80. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
81. See Elston Inv., Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 437 (7th Cir.
1984) (plaintiff-appellant was an Illinois limited partnership); Anchorage-Hynning & Co.
v. Moringiello, 697 F.2d 356, 357 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (plaintiff-appellant
was a limited partnership recognized by the District of Columbia); Windward City
Center v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Hawaii
1985) (plaintiff-appellant was a Hawaii limited partnership); Schmidt v. E.N. Maisel &
Assocs., 105 F.R.D. 157, 157 (E.D. Ill. 1985) (defendant-appellee was a limited partner-
ship of Michigan).
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status for partnerships.82
Capacity alone as a test for diversity conflicts with the rules as articu-
lated by the Supreme Court. It is, moreover, beyond the purpose of Rule
17(b). At one time, common law did not recognize an unincorporated
association's right to sue or be sued as an entity. Today, some states
allow it by statute.8 3 Rule 17(b) merely requires federal courts to follow
state law in determining whether to allow an unincorporated association
to sue as an entity.84 Consequently, Rule 17(b) is irrelevant to the diver-
sity jurisdiction inquiry which, until the Supreme Court or Congress acts
otherwise, still looks to the citizenship of each member of an unincorpo-
rated association.
B. "Capacity Plus"
In an effort to reconcile the exclusion of limited partners with the
"persons composing" rule mandated by the Supreme Court, some com-
mentators have urged an analysis that includes those who have both ca-
pacity to sue under Rule 17(b) and those who share liability and
participate in the control of the business-a "capacity plus" inquiry. 5
Such an analysis follows Supreme Court precedent no better than an
unembellished Rule 17(b) analysis.8 6 Not only is the standard by which
a court would measure control and liability somewhat uncertain, but its
application would fail to recognize only general partners as jurisdiction-
ally significant.
A general partner may actually have less at stake than a limited part-
ner when the limited partnership becomes a party defendant in a civil
action. It is true that limited partners are only liable for partnership
debts up to the amount of their contribution, 7 while general partners
may also be jointly and severally liable as individuals.88 Any individual
82. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
83. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1861, at 451
(1972). The common law regarded partnerships as aggregates of individuals, not as enti-
ties. See J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership 18-19 (1968).
84. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 60, § 1564, at 740-42; 7A C. Wright & A.
Miller, supra note 83, § 1861, at 451.
85. This analysis was proposed a year after the Carlsberg decision. See Limited Part-
nerships, supra note 18, at 400-02. The author noted that a pure Rule 17(b) analysis
would not explain the general partners only result of the Colonial line of cases. See id. at
401. However, if controlling persons who lacked capacity to sue, namely other general
partners, were also included, the desired result would occur. The author believed that his
extended capacity inquiry would yield a result identical to a real party in interest inquiry.
See id. at 402-04.
86. Insofar as it would result in less than all the members of the limited partnership
being counted for diversity purposes, the test conflicts with Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S.
677 (1889) and Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900), which were
endorsed in Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980).
87. R.U.L.P.A. § 303 (1976); U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916).
88. Section 9 of the ULPA refers to the liability of general partners in limited partner-
ships. It incorporates by reference the Uniform Partnership Act's section on partners'
liability: "All partners are liable: (a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to
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liability, however, is no more than potential when only the partnership is
being sued, because without gaining personal jurisdiction over particular
partners and joining them to the action as individuals, their own assets
cannot be reached. 9 No one, as a general rule, is subject to personal
liability when the suit is against the limited partnership.9" Since only the
partnership assets are at risk, and often the contribution of the limited
partners toward the purchase of those assets exceeds that of the general
partners, the limited partners' liability may actually be greater than that
of the general partners. Accordingly, limited partners could readily be
included under the liability analysis. Furthermore, when the partnership
is plaintiff, the liability prong of the "capacity plus" approach is
meaningless.
Similarly, limited partners could satisfy a control inquiry, especially in
those jurisdictions that have modeled their limited partnership statute on
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA),9' which gives
the partnership under sections 13 and 14." [including "Wrongful Acts" and "Breaches of
Trust"]. U.P.A. § 15 (1914).
89. See, e.g., Detrio v. United States, 264 F.2d 658, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1959) (personal
property of partners who were not personally served is not subject to judgments against
the partnership); Antiel v. V.W.E. Inv., 353 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Minn. App. 1984) (judg-
ment binds partnership, but not individual partners improperly served); Eule v. Eule Mo-
tor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 547, 170 A.2d 241, 246 (1961) (judgment against partnership does
not bind partners individually).
Of course, the "potential" personal liability of the general partners often becomes ac-
tual liability when the general partners are served individually. Yet, the resolution of a
jurisdictional inquiry to determine the citizenship of a partnership party should not de-
pend on the presence or absence of other individual defendants. The scope of any citizen-
ship inquiry should be confined to the characteristics of the particular party.
90. In the extraordinary situation where a judgment forces a partnership into bank-
ruptcy, and the partnership assets are insufficient, the partners "must contribute towards
the losses." U.P.A. § 18(a) (1914); see Crane & Bromberg, supra note 83, at 524. The
same is true for general partners in a limited partnership, whereas the limited partners'
surplus of assets over liabilities is not counted as property of the bankrupt partnership.
Id. at 529, 562.
91. See Ala. Code §§ 10-9A-1 to -203 (Supp. 1985); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-301
to -366 (Supp. 1985); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-501 to -566 (1980 & Supp. 1985); Cal. Corp.
Code §§ 15511-15623, 15611-15723 (West Supp. 1986); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-62-101 to -
1201 (Supp. 1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-9 to -38o (West 1981 & Supp. 1985);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to -1107 (Supp. 1984); Idaho Code §§ 53-201 to -267
(Supp. 1985); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 545.101-.1106 (West Supp. 1985); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§§ 56-lal0l to -la607 (1983); Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. 10-101 to -1104 (1985);
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 109, §§ 1-62 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 449.1101-.2108 (West Supp. 1985); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 322A.01-.87 (West 1981
& Supp. 1985); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 359.011-.691 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (effective Jan. 1,
1987); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 35-12-501 to -1404 (1985); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 67-233 to -297
(1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 88-315 to -645 (1985) (effective Jan. 1, 1987); N.J. Rev. Stat.
§§ 42:2A-1 to -72 (Supp. 1985); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 45-10.1-01 to -62 (Supp. 1985); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1782.01-.62 (Page 1985); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 54, §§ 301-364 (West
Supp. 1985); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 7-13-1 to -65 (1985); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 33-42-10 to
-2020 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1985); Va. Code §§ 50-73.1 to -77 (Supp. 1985) (effective Jan. 1,
1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 25.10.010-.690 (Supp. 1986); W. Va. Code §§ 47-9-1 to
-63 (Supp. 1985); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 179.01-.94 (Supp. 1985); Wyo. Stat. §§ 17-14-201 to
-1104 (Supp. 1985).
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far more power to the cautious limited partner than does the original
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA).92 Sections 302"3 and 303'4 of
the RULPA give a limited partner considerable power in certain circum-
stances without the concomitant" risk of incurring a general partner's
liability. Limited partners in RULPA jurisdictions can remove general
partners96 and bring derivative suits.97 They may vote and veto exten-
sively concerning important matters if the partnership agreement allows
them to do so,98 may act as the partnership's agents, contractors, em-
ployees or sureties,99 and may seek dissolution of the partnership."ic
Even under the original act, 0 1 still in force in a sizable minority of
jurisdictions,'0 2 limited partners have certain powers, 10 3 including voting
92. See infra note 95. Compare U.L.P.A. § 10 (1916) (limiting the powers of the
limited partners) and id. § 9 (listing the decisions that general partners may not make
without the limited partners' consent) with R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1976) (giving limited par-
ties the right to vote on any matter if partnership agreement allows).
93. RULPA section 302 states that subject only to § 303, "the partnership agreement
may grant to all or a specified group of the limited partners the right to vote (on a per
capita or other basis) upon any matter." R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1976).
94. RULPA section 303 reads:
Liability to Third Parties-
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the
obligations of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes
part in the control of the business. However, if the limited partner's participa-
tion in the control of the business is not substantially the same as the exercise of
the powers of a general partner, he is liable only to persons who transact business
with the limited partnership with actual knowledge of his participation in control.
Id § 303 (emphasis added).
Part (b) of this section is a non-exclusive but extensive list of the activities in which a
limited partner may participate without "participating in the control" of the business. See
id § 303(b).
95. A policy behind the creation of the RULPA was to extend the powers of the
limited partners. Proceedings in Committee of the Whole National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws 89 (Aug. 2-4, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Uniform
Laws Proceedings]. Although there was protest that §§ 302(a) and 302(b)(2) read to-
gether meant that limited partners could virtually control the partnership, id. at 82, a
motion to strike part of § 303(a) was not carried. Id. at 98-99.
96. See R.U.L.P.A. § 303(b)(5)(v) (1976); ALI Materials 1983, supra note 26, at 95-
97.
97. See R.U.L.P.A. § 1001 (1976) (conditions the limited partners' ability to bring
derivative suits).
98. See id. § 302 (stating that subject to § 303 (Liability to Third Parties) the partner-
ship agreement may grant to all limited partners the right to vote on any matter).
99. See id § 303(b)(1)-(3); 6 Resource Materials: Partnership 63 (ALI Continuing
Education Series 1985) [hereinafter cited as ALI Materials 1985].
100. See R.U.L.P.A. § 303(b)(5)(i) (1976); ALI Materials 1983, supra note 26, at 44.
101. Several states, however, have modified ULPA § 7 to particularize certain activi-
ties in which limited partners may safely participate. See ALI Materials 1983, supra note
26, at 57. The Texas statute is especially comprehensive. See Tex Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 6132a, § 8[b] (Vernon Supp. 1986) (greatly enlarges a limited partner's powers, and
adds a reliance factor similar to that of the RULPA).
102. Alaska Stat. §§ 32.10.010-.290 (1962); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-201 to -229 (1981 &
Supp. 1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 620.01-.32 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); Ga. Code Ann.
§§ 14-9-1 to -91 (1984); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 425-21 to -52 (1976 & Supp. 1984); I1. Ann.
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rights" 4 and the ability to act as advisors or consultants when the part-
nership is experiencing difficulty. 05 They have the power to cause disso-
lution of the partnership' 06 and may be the directors of a corporation
that is the sole general partner.107 Furthermore, even though their con-
trol is technically curbed by statute, it is uncertain how much influence
the monied limited partners exert.
Therefore, a jurisdictional test that looks beyond capacity to sue and
also counts members with liability or control, or both,108 would not con-
sistently yield a "general partners only" result, because in some situa-
tions the limited partners may exercise more power and have more
capital at risk than the general partners.
C. Real Party in Interest
In an analysis similar to that of capacity to sue, some commentators
have focused on the real party in interest concept 09 as a rationale for
Stat. ch. 1061/2, §§ 44-73 (Smith-Hurd 1952 & Supp. 1985); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-4-2-1
to -31 (Burns 1984); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 362.410-.700 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp.
1984); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, §§ 151-181 (1964 & Supp. 1985); Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 79-13-I to -57 (1972); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 305:1-:30 (1984); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 54-2-I to -30 (1978); N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 90-12011 (McKinney Supp. 1986);
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 59-1 to -30 (1982); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 69.150-.530 (1984); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 59, §§ 501-545 (Purdon Supp. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 48-6-1 to -64
(1983); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 61-2-101 to -130 (1980 & Supp. 1985); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 6132a, §§ 1-31 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1986); Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2-1 to -27
(1981); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1391-1419 (1984). Louisiana is the only state that recog-
nizes neither the ULPA nor the RULPA. Its equivalent to the limited partnership is the
"partnership in commendam," addressed in La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2839-2851 (West
1952 & Supp. 1985).
103. See U.L.P.A. § 10 (1916). For a further discussion of the limited partners' pow-
ers to bring derivative suits or seek dissolution under § 10, see ALI Materials 1983, supra
note 26, at 82-84.
104. See U.L.P.A. § 9(1)(e) (1916) (consent of all limited partners needed to admit
person as general partner); R.U.L.P.A. § 401 (1976) (each partner must agree to admis-
sion of new general partners). "Partner" is defined as limited or general in RULPA
§ 101(8). See ALI Materials 1983, supra note 26, at 96.
105. See Weil v. Diversified Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778, 782 (D.D.C. 1970).
106. See U.L.P.A. § 10(1)(c) (1916); ALI Materials 1983, supra note 26, at 83-84.
107. See Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400, 405, 562
P.2d 244, 247 (1977). But see Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex.
1975) (limited partner personally liable if he participates in control of partnership busi-
ness as officer of corporate general partner).
108. A functional test that examines each partner's contributions and control would be
lengthy and impractical. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. A presumption
that limited partners do not exercise any significant control in a limited partnership ex-
ceeding a determined number of members would not solve the problem, since the party
opposed to the result of the presumption would be entitled to rebut it. The court would
then still be required to engage in a sometimes difficult threshold inquiry. Moreover, it
would be difficult to create a realistic presumption concerning how much capital each
limited partner had contributed.
109. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) states in pertinent part:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of an-
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excluding limited partners. 1 Although the Supreme Court in Navarro
Savings Association v. Lee"'I examined the role of a real party in interest
inquiry within the diversity analysis,"' the decision cannot properly be
interpreted as an endorsement of real prty in interest as determinative of
whose citizenship is significant in a diversity case." 3 In Navarro, eight
individual trustees of a business trust sued in their own names in federal
court with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.' Defendant, a
Texas savings association, argued that the plaintiff was the business trust
itself, which was in substance an unincorporated association, whose ben-
eficial shareholders were therefore relevant in a diversity inquiry. 5 Be-
cause some of those shareholders were Texas citizens, defendant argued,
complete diversity was lacking. 1 6 The Court, however, pointed out that
the plaintiff was not the business trust. Rather, the individual trustees,
who were long recognized as entitled to bring diversity suits in their own
names on the basis of their own citizenship, were the plaintiffs."I7
Any attempt to extend Navarro to justify a "general partners only"
rule in the limited partnership situation fails for two reasons. First, the
other, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name without joining
with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought ....
Id. Every action must be prosecuted by the person who, according to substantive law, is
entitled to enforce some legal right. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 60, § 1543,
at 643; Business Entities, supra note 18, at 251. Federal common law recognizes that
certain persons who bring suit in a representative capacity should be considered the real
parties in interest rather than the ones for whose benefit the suit is brought. See 6 C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 60, § 1548, at 667-70. Nevertheless, because it assumes
that those representatives enumerated are granted the capacity to sue under applicable
state law, Rule 17(a) alone does not dispose of the question.
110. See, e.g., Note, Diversity of Citizenship and the Limited Partnship: A "Real
Party" Rule as Federal Common Law, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 235, 263 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as Common Law]; Business Entities, supra note 18, at 247-49 (1978); Limited Partner-
ships, supra note 18, at 402-04; Real Parties, supra note 10, at 1063-65.
111. 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
112. See id. at 460.
113. Respondents had emphasized that they were bringing suit as individuals, and that
the trust for whom they were the trustees was not a party. Respondents' Brief at 3,
Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1982). As early as 1808, trustees of express
trusts could bring diversity actions in their own names on the basis of their own citizen-
ships. Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306, 308 (1808). Now Rule 17(a)
provides that such trustees are real parties in interest. The Navarro Court recognized this
status, but emphasized that the Rule 17(a) real party in interest standard is not identical
to the rule that diversity jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of the real parties to the
controversy. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 462 n.9.
114. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 459.
115. See Petitioner's Brief at 16, Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1982). Peti-
tioner's sole point of argument was that the real estate investment trust involved was an
unincorporated association and not an express trust. See id. at 8. Accordingly, Chapman
and Great Southern control and the residence of each shareholder was significant. See id.
at 21-24. Although the Supreme Court disagreed with the classification of the trust as an
unincorporated association, it did cite Chapman and Great Southern with approval. See
Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461.
116. See Petitioner's Brief at 8-9, Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1982).
117. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 462.
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Supreme Court expressly distinguished the business trust involved in that
case from an unincorporated association."" More importantly, even
within the business trust context, the Court did not find real party in
interest to be dispositive of the citizenship inquiry in a diversity
analysis. 19
Although real party in interest, like capacity to sue, does play a part in
a court's overall decision on whether it can hear a case,' 0 it does not
bear on the citizenship issue. In Navarro, the Court first decided that the
business trust was an express trust.' 21 Consequently, Rule 17(a), codify-
ing a longstanding common law rule,122 expressly allowed the trustees to
sue in their own right without regard to the citizenship of the trust bene-
ficiaries. 123 Since the trustees sued as individuals, the Court ruled that
the entity was simply not a party to the suit.'
2 4
Attempts have been made to extend by analogy the real party in inter-
est analysis to limited partnerships in order to justify excluding the citi-
zenship of limited partners. 125 The analogy, however, fails' 26 for several
reasons. Initially, it must be emphasized that the history of Rule 17(a)
lacks any direct jurisdictional purpose. 12 7 The Rule was originally
118. See id.
119. See id. n.9. Because there is a "rough symmetry," id., between Rule 17(a)'s real
party in interest standard and the rule that diversity jurisdiction depends on the citizen-
ship of real parties to the controversy, it may be that in many cases the real party in
interest and the one whose citizenship is examined for diversity are identical. This identi-
cal result, however, will not occur in all cases. See id. The Court noted that in Bouligny,
the labor union was the Rule 17(a) real party in interest, but for diversity purposes, the
union had to rely on the citizenship of each of its members. See id.
120. Real party in interest identifies the person who possesses an enforceable right, and
is limited to plaintiffs. 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 60, § 1542, at 639.
121. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 462.
122. See infra note 137.
123. Rule 17(a) states in pertinent part: "An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust .... or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name
without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 17(a).
124. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 459-62.
125. See, e.g., Elston Inv. Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 438 (7th
Cir. 1984) (defendant unsuccessfully argued business trust-limited partnership analogy);
Real Parties, supra note 10, at 1063-65 (real party in interest analysis is well suited to
limited partnerships). Even before Navarro contributed to the real party analysis, it had
been suggested that the citizenship of the real party in interest was significant in deter-
mining diversity. See Lee v. Navarro Say. Ass'n, 597 F.2d 421, 425-27 (5th Cir. 1979)
(dicta) (court analogized a business trust to a limited partnership), aff'd, 446 U.S. 458
(1980); Common Law, supra note 110, at 264 (limited partnerships should proceed under
real party jurisdictional rule similar to Navarro); Business Entities, supra note 18, at 247-
51 (real party in interest should determine citizenship in diversity cases).
126. See, e.g., New York State Teachers Retirement Sys. v. Kalkus, 764 F.2d 1015,
1018 (4th Cir. 1985) (analogy approach rejected); Elston Inv., Ltd. v. David Altman
Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Trent Realty Assocs. v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir. 1981) (same).
127. See 3A J. Moore, supra note 68, 17.09[l.-1], at 17-82 ("At the outset it must be
remembered that Rule 17(a) does not enlarge or restrict federal jurisdiction.").
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drafted to assist only plaintiffs.' 28 Although the Rule has since devel-
oped a protective function vis a vis the defendant as well-to ensure
proper preclusive effect to the judgment and to shield the defendant from
multiple suits rightly brought together' 2 9-this purpose has no bearing
on the jurisdictional issue. 3 Furthermore, as stated earlier, Rule 82
prohibits expansion or contraction of federal jurisdiction through con-
struction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13 1
Navarro itself does not sanction use of a real party in interest test to
determine jurisdiction.' 32 Even if Navarro could be read to sanction its
use in the business trust case, it should not be extended to other entities
merely because their structures are somewhat similar.'3 3 In Navarro, the
Court could not resolve the jurisdictional question until it had properly
categorized the business trust as an unincorporated association, a corpo-
ration or an express trust. 3  The Court duly noted the similarities be-
tween business trusts and unincorporated associations, and that they also
shared some corporate characteristics, yet none of these factors was deci-
sive. '35 Instead, the Court found that the business trust was an express
trust.136 No policy considerations went into the Navarro Court's deter-
mination. After determining that respondent was an express trust, the
Court applied the proper citizenship test for express trusts. Because one
hundred and fifty years of precedent allowed trustees of an express trust
to bring diversity actions in their own names and on the basis of their
own citizenship, no new rule was needed.' 37  Unincorporated associa-
tions, like limited partnerships that do not come under the express trust
label, do not come under the scope of Navarro.
Although, as in Navarro, the real party in interest and the citizenship
128. See White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (the purpose of 17(a) was to change the old common law rule that prevented an
assignee of a chose in action from prosecuting except in the name of the assignor), aff'd
sub nor. Quaglia v. Profexray Inc., 578 F.2d 1375 (1978); 3A J. Moore, supra note 68, C
17.09[1.-I], at 17-82 (same).
129. See Commonwealth of P.R. v. Cordeco Dev. Corp., 534 F. Supp. 612, 614
(D.P.R. 1982); James v. Nashville Bridge Co., 74 F.R.D. 595, 597 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
130. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Moreover, real party in interest ob-
jections can be waived. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 60, § 1554, at 700-02.
Subject matter jurisdiction of course can never be waived by the parties. See Mansfield,
C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 384 (1884).
131. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
133. Cf Navarro, 446 U.S. at 463 n.10 (Court has never analogized express trusts to
business entities for diversity purposes). See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
134. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461-62.
135. See id at 462.
136. See id
137. See id at 465-66. The Court cited Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 306, 307-08 (1808), which held that trustees of an express trust were entitled to
bring diversity actions in their own names, based on their own citizenship. See Navarro,
446 U.S. at 462.
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inquiries often yield the same result, 3 ' the two nonetheless remain dis-
tinct. Indeed, the Court emphasized that the "two rules serve different
purposes and need not produce identical outcomes in all cases."'139 It
thereby expressly distinguished the real party in interest of Rule 17(a)
from the relevant real party for citizenship. The notion of real party for
citizenship used in Navarro 1" is no more than another way of identifying
which persons had figured in Great Southern's "persons composing"
test.'41 Ever since that decision, courts have implicitly relied on the real
party for citizenship concept to determine which persons should be
deemed to compose a given association before applying a "persons com-
posing" test.
Real party for citizenship does not lose its significance merely because
it sometimes coincides with real party in interest. 142 It is true, however,
that courts often neglect to articulate real party for citizenship as a sepa-
rate concept once real party in interest has been determined. In Navarro,
the Supreme Court voiced a concept essential to the vitality of the "per-
sons composing" test: real party for citizenship and real party in interest
are clearly distinct, and it is real party for citizenship that determines
whose citizenship is significant if the results of each inquiry are not iden-
tical. 43 Thus, it is improper to analogize between individuals who tradi-
tionally may sue in their own right and associations, some members of
which, by virtue of their designation as real parties in interest, may sue in
a representative capacity on behalf of the association.
Considerations unrelated to jurisdictional considerations for unincor-
porated associations gave rise to the capacity to sue and real party in
interest concepts.' Neither was pertinent in the creation of the "per-
sons composing" rule; neither is significant in its application.
138. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 462 n.9. This is the usual result when individuals sue in
their own names, as did the trustees in Navarro. See id. at 458-59.
139. See id. at 462 n.9.
140. See id.
141. In Navarro, the Court stated that only "persons" could be real parties to a contro-
versy. See id. at 461. Historically, the unincorporated association has not been recog-
nized as a "person," but rather as a mere collection of individuals. See id. The
individuals qualify as the "persons" able to be real parties to the controversy. See Id.
The citizenship of these real party "persons"-the several individuals-determines diver-
sity. See id. The real parties referred to are not the Rule 17(a) real parties in interest, but
the real parties to the controversy, a distinction the Court explicitly makes later in its
opinion. See id. at 462 n.9. Thus, it is the real parties to the controversy who are the
"persons" in the traditional persons composing rule. See id. at 460.
142. Such obviously is the case where one individual sues another. Where a class has
been certified, the named representatives are both real parties in interest and the only
ones whose citizenship will be considered for diversity. See C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 60, at 170.
143. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 462 n.9. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 66, 127-28 and accompanying text.
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III. UNDERLYING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR INCLUDING
LIMITED PARTNERS IN THE DIVERSITY FORMULA
Whatever the realities of the early eighteenth century that gave rise to
diversity jurisdiction, 145 many modem judges and commentators agree
that its principal justification, fear of local prejudice, 46 is generally un-
founded today. 47 Since diversity accounts for a large percentage of cases
heard by the federal courts, 4 8 parties presenting genuine federal ques-
tions are delayed, and the federal system is overburdened.
Moreover, because it is often unclear which members of the limited
partnership are truly "limited,"' 149 application of a rule that looks to the
citizenship of only general partners would be difficult. It is possible for
some to have become general partners by exercising too much control.'I"
The "control" test comes from the ULPA, which unfortunately fails to
145. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 4, at 893-94; Note, The Historic Basic of Diver-
sity Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 492-99.
146. Legislative history concerning the adoption of diversity jurisdiction, both in the
Constitution and in the Judiciary Act of 1789, is disappointingly scant. Some opposition
to it was expressed even among the founding fathers, but little rationale for its support
has been preserved. See The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 487-
88. Chief Justice Marshall alluded to "fears and apprehensions" on the part of aliens or
citizens of different states who would otherwise find themselves before state tribunals.
See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). Justice Story
mentioned state prejudices and jealousies as the only reasons stated that could account
for diversity. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816). He
offered no opinion on the soundness of the constitutional presumption that such
prejudices existed. See id James Madison, a proponent of diversity, believed that its
need and therefore its existence would be only temporary, because Congress would return
the power to hear diversity cases to the state courts once they were on "good footing." 3
Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 536 (. Elliot rev. ed. 1891).
147. See Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53-60 (1954)
(Frankfurther, J., concurring) (scathing criticism of diversity jurisdiction); CJ. Burger's
1977 Report to the American Bar Association, 63 A.B.A. J. 504, 506 (1977) (fear of
prejudice is unfounded today) [hereinafter cited as Burger]; Hunter, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction: The Unnecessary Precaution, 46 UMKC L. Rev. 347, 349 (1978) (prejudice
today is minimal or nonexistent); Rubin, supra note 22, at 16-17; cf Rowe, Abolishing
Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potentialfor Further Reforms, 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 963 (1979) (advances the advantages of abolishing diversity without directly refuting
the prejudice argument). But see Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 Yale
L.J 7, 12 (1963) (prejudice must be taken into account); Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction:
Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 Brooklyn L. Rev. 197, 201-05 (1982) (state
court bias is a valid reason to retain diversity); McFarland, Diversity Jurisdiction: Is Lo-
cal Prejudice Feared?, Litigation, Fall 1980, at 38, 55 (fear of local prejudice is still
widespread).
148. OCA Statistics for the 12 months ended June 30, 1984 show that of the approxi-
mately 150,000 civil cases filed in federal court in which the United States was not a
party, approximately 38% were diversity cases. See OCA Statistics, supra note 22, Table
C-2, at 253-55. Diversity actions account for one third of all trials and one half of all jury
days in federal court. See Rubin, supra note 22, at 18.
149. See Abrams, Imposing Liability for "Control" Under § 7 of the ULPA, 28 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 785, 786-90 (1978); ALI Materials 1985, supra note 99, at 49-51 (concerning
the "control problem").
150. See, eg., Van Arsdale v. Claxton, 391 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (limited
partner involved with operation of enterprise is no longer sheltered); Delaney v. Fidelity
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define "control."'' The RULPA retains the vague control test, but in-
troduces a reliance factor as well.' 52 Consequently, a lengthy factual in-
quiry may often be necessary. As with any rule emanating from ad hoc
determinations of fact, inconsistencies will arise, even within the same
jurisdiction. Since the tests differ, discrepancies between ULPA and
RULPA jurisdictions would certainly arise as well. Because a court may
raise the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte,153 an appellate court that raises
the issue may not have facts in the record on which to base a final deter-
mination, thereby necessitating remand and considerable delay. A cer-
tain amount of threshold litigation154 is unavoidable, but a new
jurisdictional standard, derived through manipulation of procedural
rules, further burdens the courts without conferring a corresponding
benefit.
Concern has been expressed that the often harsh result of a rule that
includes all members for diversity purposes would discourage the forma-
tion of limited partnerships.'55 It is true that the limited partnership is a
valuable vehicle for investors today, and its decline might have an ad-
verse economic effect. The modern limited partnership, however, was
"born" in 1822156 and grew to be a significant feature of the business
community in spite of the reign of the "persons composing" rule. 57 Of
course, any possible negative effect the test may have had on the growth
of the limited partnership cannot be measured accurately. Nevertheless,
"it takes some imagination to believe that limited partnerships would be
Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543, 545-46 (Tex. 1975) (limited partners controlling business as
officers of sole corporate general partner were not insulated from liability).
151. ULPA § 7 provides that "[a] limited partner shall not become liable as a general
partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he
takes part in the control of the business." U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916).
152. "[I]f the limited partner's participation in the control of the business is not sub-
stantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner, he is liable only to
persons who transact business with the limited partnership with actual knowledge of his
participation in control." R.U.L.P.A. § 303(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
153. See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804).
154. In Navarro, Justice Blackmun's dissent troubled the majority because a case by
case inquiry to identify the real parties in interest would present "serious difficulties [in
determining] questions of diversity jurisdiction." Navarro, 446 U.S. at 464 n.13. The
Court noted that "[i]t is of first importance to have a definition ... [that] will not invite
extensive threshold litigation over jurisdiction .... Id. (quoting the ALI Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts 128 (1969)).
155. See, e.g., Limited Partners and Diversity, supra note 19, at 315-16 (allowing lim-
ited partnerships a federal forum would promote commerce); 16 Duq. L. Rev. 221, 234
(1977-78) (denying federal forum deters formation of limited partnerships); 46 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 657, 666 (1978) (applying traditional rule is likely to deter economic
growth).
156. Limited partners are creatures of statute, with the first such law adopted by New
York. See 1822 N.Y. Laws 259. See ALI Materials 1985, supra note 99, at 34-35 for a
history of the limited partnership.
157. The rule began with Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889) (citizenship of
"all the members" determines diversity), and was most recently approved by the Supreme
Court in Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980) (citing Chapman as rule for
determining unincorporated associations' diversity status).
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created in deliberate anticipation of a need for diversity jurisdiction."'158
It takes as much imagination to believe that a significant number of lim-
ited partnerships would not be created for fear of some future dispute in
which they might be denied access to federal court. 5 9 A limited partner-
ship may find itself as either plaintiff or defendant and, therefore, might
wish to avoid federal jurisdiction as often as it might wish to seek it. It is
ironic that in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 'I the seminal case
excluding limited partners, the limited partnership argued in favor of the
traditional rule requiring the citizenship of each member to be counted
and that complete diversity was lacking. 61 Thus, providing a federal
forum for limited partnerships does not justify manipulating a well estab-
lished principle.
CONCLUSION
Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor the Supreme Court's
treatment of unincorporated associations, nor the policies underlying di-
versity as a basis for federal jurisdiction support granting limited partner-
ships easier access to federal courts by considering only the citizenship of
general partners. Moreover, diversity's depletion of the federal judici-
ary's resources without any corresponding benefit militates against ma-
nipulation of nonjurisdictional rules to achieve a jurisdictional result.
The Navarro Court was wise to reaffirm the vitality of the "persons com-
posing" rule, just as the Bouligny Court was prudent in declining to
modify it, leaving any such decision in the hands of Congress.
Hediwig M. Auletta
158. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1265-
66 (3d Cir. 1977) (Hunter, J., dissenting).
159. In an extensive list of relevant non-tax factors to be considered when deciding on
an appropriate type of business form, the difficulty of access to federal court in a future
diversity case was not mentioned in ALI Materials 1983, supra note 26, at 8-9.
160. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
161. Id. at 183.

